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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THF STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
HARVEY W. DORTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19282 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with Bail Jumping, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-R-312 
(1953), as amended, for failure to appear at trial while 
released on bail. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty as charged on April 27, 
1983, in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge, presiding. Appellant was 
sentenced on May 23, l'l83, to serve an indeterminate term of 
zero to five years in the Utah State Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks the affirmation of the judgment and 
sentence entered below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January lQRl, Appellant was charged with several 
First Degree Felonies: Attempted Criminal Homicide, 
Aggravated Burglary, Aggravated Kidnapping, Aggravated Robbery 
and Aggravated Sexual Assault. Appellant's trial was 
scheduled for February 18, 1Q82 (R. 87). some time before the 
trial began, appellant was released on bail through Dewey's 
Bail Bonds (R. 99). 
Appellant's trial began on February IA, as 
scheduled. At the end of the day, the court ordered a recess 
until the following morning. The court admonished all parties 
to return at 10:00 a.m. on February 19 (R. 87-88). Appellant 
failed to appear. After waiting for a period of time, the 
trial resumed at 1:30 p.m. on the 19th of February and 
concluded that same day (R. 88-89). 
Nearly five months later on July 5, 1983, James R. 
Phelps, an employee of Dewey's Bail Bonds, located appellant 
at his sister's house in Houston Texas (R. 99). At that time 
appellant fled from Phelps. Id. Twelve hours later, still on 
July 5, Phelps apprehended appellant and advised him that he 
was under arrest for the charge of bail jumping. He also 
informed appellant that he had the power to place appellant 
under arrest under federal statutes as a bounty hunter (R. 
102). Phelps accompanied appellant to the Houston Police 
Station where he appellant ( R. 101). Phelps had no 
conversation with appellant concerning his presence in Texas 
(R. 102). 
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Appellant was tried in Utah for Bails Jumping. 
(luring closing arguments, the County Attorney made the 
fol lowing comment: 
When [appellant] was arrested he gave no 
explanation as to what he was doing there, 
at least that is what Mr. Phelps told us, 
and there is no evidence here today that 
suggests that he had any legal 
justification for leaving (R. 123). 
Appellant's counsel objected, claiming that the above was a 
comments on appellant's post arrest silence and on his failure 
to take the stand in his own behalf (R. 123, 128). The trial 
court admonished the jury to remember the instruction that had 
been given on appellant's not taking the stand. The court 
further stated that it's instruction was the law as it would 
he followed and that there would be no further argument or 
comment by counsel on it (R. 123). Later, counsel made a 
motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor's comment (R. 
127). The motion was taken under advisement and later denied 
( R. 129). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENT CONCERNING 
APPELLANT'S SILENCE WHILE IN A BOUNTY 
HUNTER'S CUSTODY DID NOT VIOLATE 
APPELLANT'S FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS. 
Appellant correctly states the rule of Doyle v. 
Ohio, 426 u.s. 610 ( 1975), that a suspect's post arrest 
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silence after he has been given his Miranda rights cannot be 
used against the suspect in his subsequent trial. 426 u.s. at 
619. This rule, however, does not apply in the present case. 
The prosecutor's comment was directed specifically 
to appellant's silence while he was in a bail bondsman's 
custody (R. 123). There is no evidence on the record 
indicating that the bail bondsman, Mr. Phelps, gave appellant 
his Miranda rights, a crucial factor in Doyle. Nor is there 
any reason why Phelps should have done so. 
Bail bondsman when making an arrest do not act as 
officers of the state or the courts. The bondsman, in 
exchange for a fee and pursuant to contract, secures the 
principle's release fran confinement. Maynard v. Kear, 474 
F.Supp. 794, 801 (N.D. Ohio, E.D. 1979). The bondsman assumes 
the duty of seeing that the principle appears before the court 
at appointed times and will incur a financial penalty for 
failure in that duty. Id. The bondsman may arrest the 
principle at any time and turn him over to the local 
authorities in order to avoid incurring a penalty. At common 
law, the power to make this arrest is "not a matter of 
criminal procedure, but arises from the private undertaking 
implied in the furnishing of the bond." Ouzts v. Maryland 
National Insurance Co., 505 F.2d 547, 551 (9th Cir. 1974), 
quoting Fitzpatrick v. Williams, 46 F.2d 40, 40-41 (5th Cir. 
1931). The arrest power of the state and that of the bondsman 
are two distinct rights. One is based on the general police 
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power of the state while the other arises out of a contract 
between the parties. Id. Of course, the state may enter and 
regulate the field of bail bonds, but in so doing the state 
does not make the bondsman its agent. The bondsman's right to 
arrest does not spring initially of statute; it was created 
and exists primarily as a contract right. Id. 
Since the bondsman is not acting as a state 
authority or keeper of the peace, the custody he exerts over 
his principle is not that required in Doyle v. Ohio, supra. 
The bondsman making an arrest acts in a manner analogous to a 
private security guard apprehending a shoplifter. At least 
one state court has held that prosecutorial comment on 
testimony of private security guards concerning a defendant's 
silence while in their custody is not subject to the Doyle 
prohibitionestate v. Pickett, 37 or. App. 239, 586 P.2d 824 
(1978). A similar finding should be made regarding 
appellant's silence while in Mr. Phelps' custody. 
Assuming arguendo, that Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 
applied in the present case, a trial court's judgment will not 
be overturned for a comment on the defendant's post arrest 
silence unless the comment was prejudicial to the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. State v. Wiswell, Utah, 639 P.2d 146, 
147 (1981). The standard for prejudice is whether there was a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant in absence of the prosecution's comment. State v. 
Fisher, Utah, P.2d __ , No. 18452 slip op. at 2 (March 8, 
-s-
1984). The following factors usually arply: (1) tn wh,1t use 
did the prosecution put defendant's post arrest silence; (2) 
Who initially elected to pursue the line of questioning nr 
arguement; (3) What quantum of other evidence indicated 
defendant's guilt; (4) What was the intensity and frequency of 
the references to defendant's post arrest silence; (5) Did the 
trial judge have an opportunity to grant a motion for mistrial 
or to give curative instructions. Williams v. Zahradneck, 632 
F.2d 353, 3fi0-62 (4th Cir. 1980). Utah has recognized many of 
these factors. In State v. Wiswell, supra, a case heavily 
relied upon by appellant, the court granted reversal only 
after noting that the prosecutor had made continued attempts 
to bring defendant's post arrest silence to the jury's 
attention. Id. at 147. Furthermore, the court had neither 
stricken the comments by the prosecutor in his final argument 
nor admonished the jury not to consider those comments. Id. 
Finally, the court in Wiswell also noted that defendant had 
been advised of his right to remain silent. Id. 
The facts of the present case stand in sharp 
contrast to those of Wiswell. First, the prosecutor made only 
one comment on appellant's post arrest silence in his closing 
argument. 
during the 
No comments or evidence had been made or presented 
course of trial. The single comment was ohjected 
to by appellant's counsel. The trial court immediately warned 
the jury not to consider appellant's silence and reminded them 
of the instruction given to that effect. The trial court also 
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,·,,irnonished counsel not to comment further on the matter. The 
prohlems that resulted in reversal in Wiswell are thus not of 
concern in the present case and a reversal should not be 
on the grounds given in Wiswell. 
Moreover, contrary to the assertions made in Point 
II of appellant's brief, there was ample evidence outside of 
the prosecutor's comment which would support the jury's 
finding of appellant's guilt. Appellant appeared at the first 
day of his trial, yet failed to make an appearance on the 
second day. It can be inferred that he failed to notify 
either the court or the bonding company. Five months later 
appellant was finally located in Texas by the bonding 
company's representative. Throughout that time appellant had 
not contacted the company to supply a legal justification for 
leaving Utah. Indeed, appellant fled from the representative 
when the two first met at appellant's sister's home in Texas. 
The only reasonable conclusion from the above facts is that 
appellant fled from Utah because he wished to avoid the 
charges filed against him and not because he had any legal 
justification to leave the court's jurisdiction. Indeed, the 
defense presented no evidence at all in its case in chief. 
The prosecutor's comment adds little to the above evidence or 
the conclusion that it supports. The comment certainly does 
not sustain a substantial part of the state's burden of proof 
as appellant claims. 
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In the present case, the prosecutor's comment was 
not naturally and necessarily directed at appellant's failure 
to testify. The comment was more ohviously directed at the 
failure of the defense to present any evidence on the question 
of guilt or innocence. The lack of evidence shows that the 
question of appellant's guilt is not a close one and the 
prosecutor committed no error, harmless or otherwise, by 
informing the jury of this in his closing argument. 
CONCLUSION 
The rule in Doyle v. Ohio, supra, does not apply to 
prosecutorial comments on a defendant's silence while in the 
custody of a bail bondsman. Even if Doyle does apply, no 
error or, at most, harmless error was committed, because there 
was sufficient evidence of appellant's guilt without any 
consideration of the comment. Finally, the prosecutor did not 
comment on appellant's failure to testify. Rather, he 
commented on the general nature and quality of the evidence 
adduced at trial. Appellant's conviction and sentence should 
be affirmed. 
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